Sicily '43: The First Assault on Fortress Europe
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- Author：James Holland
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Summary
This is the story of the biggest seaborne landing in history。
Codenamed Operation HUSKY， the assault on Sicily on 10 July 1943 remains the largest amphibious invasion ever mounted。 That day， over 160，000 Allied troops were dropped from the sky or came ashore to begin the fight for Europe。
The subsequent thirty-eight-day Battle for Sicily was one of the most dramatic of the entire war， involving daring raids by special forces， deals with the Mafia， attacks across mosquito-infested plains and perilous assaults up almost sheer faces of rock and scree。
Made worse by virulent disease and extreme heat， the Allies also had to fight their way across an island of unforgiving landscape and limited infrastructure against a German foe who would not give up。
Victory would signal the beginning of the end of the War in the West。 From here on， the noose began to tighten around the neck of Nazi Germany。 The coalition between the United States and Britain finally came of age。 And it was a crucial dry run for Operation OVERLORD， the invasion of Normandy on D-Day a year later。
Codenamed Operation HUSKY， the assault on Sicily on 10 July 1943 remains the largest amphibious invasion ever mounted。 That day， over 160，000 Allied troops were dropped from the sky or came ashore to begin the fight for Europe。
The subsequent thirty-eight-day Battle for Sicily was one of the most dramatic of the entire war， involving daring raids by special forces， deals with the Mafia， attacks across mosquito-infested plains and perilous assaults up almost sheer faces of rock and scree。
Made worse by virulent disease and extreme heat， the Allies also had to fight their way across an island of unforgiving landscape and limited infrastructure against a German foe who would not give up。
Victory would signal the beginning of the end of the War in the West。 From here on， the noose began to tighten around the neck of Nazi Germany。 The coalition between the United States and Britain finally came of age。 And it was a crucial dry run for Operation OVERLORD， the invasion of Normandy on D-Day a year later。
Reviews
Glyn
，
A very detailed account of the other， far less celebrated， major amphibious landing of WW2。 Sicily is often skimmed over in histories of the war but it was a crucial moment - forcing Hitler to divert men and materials away from other fronts， accelerating the removal of Mussolini and， crucially， serving as a testing ground for the far harder task of assailing the Atlantic Wall in the following year。Some of the main players - Alexander and Montgomery especially - are frequently derided in military A very detailed account of the other， far less celebrated， major amphibious landing of WW2。 Sicily is often skimmed over in histories of the war but it was a crucial moment - forcing Hitler to divert men and materials away from other fronts， accelerating the removal of Mussolini and， crucially， serving as a testing ground for the far harder task of assailing the Atlantic Wall in the following year。Some of the main players - Alexander and Montgomery especially - are frequently derided in military history for their supposed bungling of the Sicily campaign but Holland pushes back against this orthodoxy， patiently building a compelling argument of just how hard the task was， what the penalty for failure would have been and how justified the planners were in their caution。 He also frequently reminds us that the Allied commanders actually valued the lives of their men， in the stark contrast to the German （and indeed Russian） generals on the Eastern Front and thus preferred to let their overwhelming industrial advantage win the battle through concentrated force of bombing and artillery。Holland builds the history of the invasion through the personal accounts of a number of personnel on both sides - from the ranks， civilians， officers and the general staff （oddly enough the one cohort that gets little mention are the politicians） and these are skillfully meshed together to form an absorbing account of the Sicilian invasion and the campaign that followed it。 Reading the somewhat repetitive tales of each skirmish （Germans establish defensive position in hilltop town， Allies bombard and eventually wear them down through superior force of arms albeit with considerable losses on both sides）， one feels thankful to live an era when Europe is wedded to the idea of strategic cooperation rather than confrontation and also for the sacrifice of so many to protect our right to make those choices。 。。。more
Matt
，
Really interesting story of unheralded chapter in the European theater of WWII
Patrick Pillow
，
Another excellent work by James Holland。 The author tackles the Sicilian campaign of July-August 1943 and combats several of the myths that have rose to prominence in the last 70+ years。 Holland once again credits the use of Allied combined arms as well as debunking the idea of US/British rivalry for the conquest of Sicily。 If anything， the author helps present a side to Sir Bernard Montgomery which rarely gains traction in American military history circles。 One of the main reasons I am drawn to Another excellent work by James Holland。 The author tackles the Sicilian campaign of July-August 1943 and combats several of the myths that have rose to prominence in the last 70+ years。 Holland once again credits the use of Allied combined arms as well as debunking the idea of US/British rivalry for the conquest of Sicily。 If anything， the author helps present a side to Sir Bernard Montgomery which rarely gains traction in American military history circles。 One of the main reasons I am drawn to this author is his ability to seamlessly weave in personal accounts from both sides will still presenting a strategic perspective on the campaign as a whole。 As you read these firsthand accounts， you cannot help but hope that by the time you reach the Postscript you’ll find that your favorite “characters” did in fact survive the war。 I am eagerly anticipating the next James Holland masterpiece。 。。。more
Spenser
，
As military vet / mil history buff， I found this book very informative。 That being said， I dont think its for everybody。 It does seem to drag at times。 If you specifically want to learn about the Allied invasion （ practice run for Normandy） then this should do the trick。 If you're not into that then its too dry for many to wade through。 It is an educational book， not for entertainment value。 As military vet / mil history buff， I found this book very informative。 That being said， I dont think its for everybody。 It does seem to drag at times。 If you specifically want to learn about the Allied invasion （ practice run for Normandy） then this should do the trick。 If you're not into that then its too dry for many to wade through。 It is an educational book， not for entertainment value。 。。。more
Chris Wray
，
James Holland combines being a first-class historian with being a master storyteller， and the result is a succession of highly readable， informative and thought provoking popular narrative histories of the Second World War。 This book， on Operation HUSKY to liberate Sicily in 1943， is no exception。 He begins with a summary of the events leading up to the invasion of Sicily， starting with the North African campaign。 In 1940 Britain's overwhelming priority was the Battle of the Atlantic， and the Me James Holland combines being a first-class historian with being a master storyteller， and the result is a succession of highly readable， informative and thought provoking popular narrative histories of the Second World War。 This book， on Operation HUSKY to liberate Sicily in 1943， is no exception。 He begins with a summary of the events leading up to the invasion of Sicily， starting with the North African campaign。 In 1940 Britain's overwhelming priority was the Battle of the Atlantic， and the Mediterranean was of little strategic importance。 Rather， says Holland， "Britain's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean was largely opportunistic。 This was a part of the world where Britain could easily concentrate the assets of the Dominions and the rest of the Empire - whether manpower or supplies。。。It offered a chance to defeat Italy， making it a liability for Germany and expose the Reich's southern flank。。。It was also the perfect testing ground for a British Army that needed to grow and develop rapidly。" After early successes， Britain's fortunes waned after the deployment of the Afrika Corps in early 1941。 The period from early 1942 through to Operation Torch and onto the Allies eventual victory in Tunisia in May 1943 is wonderfully recounted in Holland's earlier book， 'Together We Stand。' At this point， two personalities stood out among the Allied military leaders: "While a host of varied factors had contributed to that huge Allied success， there was no question that Alex， as the overall Allied battlefield commander， had gripped the situation swiftly， acted with tact， charm and sound judgement， and played a key role in making sure the fighting in Tunisia was brought to a rapid and successful conclusion。 Equally， it was Eisenhower who had led from the front in terms of forging the coalition。"As the Allies moved to start planning for Husky， the challenges were gargantuan。 As well as being by far the largest amphibious operation ever attempted， against much more able opposition， and the early planning had been carried out in parallel with the Tunisian campaign so had somewhat lacked focus。 Additionally， the responsibility was on a different level as Sicily represented the Allies re-entry into Nazi occupied Europe and had a strategic and geo- political significance that the North African campaign did not。 "Alexander， for his part， also found himself in uncharted territory。 Up to this point， he had repeatedly been brought in to salvage a situation that had gone badly awry。 Now， for the first time， he was commanding a multinational force that was in the ascendency， and at this stage in the war it was essential that Allied fortunes remained that way。" The decision to invade Sicily has been finalised at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943， once it became clear that a cross channel operation would not be practicable until 1944。 To ensure success， there were certain prerequisites that everyone agreed on: "Air superiority was essential， so too was naval superiority， and so too was a sufficient speed with which ground forces could be landed and reinforced compared with the likely rate of Axis reinforcement。" Naval superiority was already in place， but air superiority was a work in progress and the potential rate of Allied reinforcement was a relative unknown。 The geography of Sicily also posed serious challenges， and the difficulties of terrain were amplified by the sparse and poorly developed road network。 Holland stridently comments that， "Historians have not been kind to the Applied planners for HUSKY。 Everyone， it seems， has had it in the neck from those sitting in the comfort of their armchairs many decades after the events took place。 Eisenhower has been accused of being too weak， Alexander for not gripping the process， everyone for being at one another's throats， and Montgomery， especially， for being brash， arrogant and selfish。。。A different point of view on the planning of HUSKY is that it was always going to be a mind-boggingly difficult operation to prepare， and that an evolving plan was entirely normal and understandable for such an enterprise in such challenging circumstances。 Furthermore， what is remarkable about the HUSKY planning is not the levels of discord involved， but rather， how well the new coalition partners were operating and rubbing along together。" He also points out that we need to be careful to read the diaries and journals of senior commanders in context; that is， as a basically private and safe way of occasionally letting off steam by men carrying astonishing levels of responsibility。 It is also certain that militating against failure trumped all other considerations。 For the Allies to be repulsed at this stage in the war， after Stalingrad and Tunisgrad， would be a terrible setback and would unquestionably push back the plans for OVERLORD。 Alexander was right when he urged the mitigation of all conceivable risks to the invasion being a success， even if posterity has often judged this to be undue caution。In addressing MINCEMEAT and related deception plans， Holland insightfully concludes that the main reason they were so successful is that they reinforced a conclusion that Hitler had already decided upon。 This is something that is seen again and again in the conduct of Nazi Germany during the war; the regime in general， and Hitler in particular， was unable to interpret events in any other way than through their own narrow world view。 In other words， they failed to consider what the Allies might do that was different to what they would have done in similar circumstances。-Moving to the campaign itself， Holland's clear assessment that the airborne operations in Sicily were disastrous - particularly the glider operations。 This is in stark contrast with the SRS （i。e。 SAS） operation to destroy the Capo Murro di Porco battery。 Paddy Mayne and the SRS landed from the sea， maintained the element of surprise， and completed their mission a swiftly and successfully。 Ironically， many of the airborne objectives （such as the Ponte Grande bridge） were also close to the sea and could have been similarly targeted。 "The British - and Americans - had developed airborne arms and so felt an obligation to use them， even though the system of air transportation to the battle zone was nowhere near ready to be deployed。 It would have been far better to use these highly trained and motivated troops in precisely the same way as had been done with the SRS。 Politics， misunderstanding， hubris and the sense of needing to test this airborne force had conspired against better sense。 The result had been an utter fiasco。"The seaborne landings， on the other hand， were highly successful and although there was some initial stiff resistance， particularly in the American sector， "by midday， whatever brief crisis the Americans had faced at Gela was over。 With it had gone the Axis forces' last chance of pushing the Allies back into the water。 The battle was far from over， even on this central southern front， but - despite the poor weather， despite the fiasco of the airborne drops， despite the immense complexity of the entire operation - the Allied landings had succeeded。 They now had a foothold in Europe。" By the 12th of July the American bridgehead was 50 miles wide， had linked up the forces from all three landings， and was more than 25 miles inland in places。 In the south east， where resistance was even less， the British and Empire forces had pushed even further inland。 For both， it was clear that， "the Allied way of war that had been developing was increasingly based on heavy firepower。 Both Britain and America had entered this war determined to use science， technology， mechanisation and their enormous global reach to the maximum， in order to get as much as possible of the hard graft done by machines rather than men。" This， in a nutshell， was the strategy of 'steel not flesh'。One incident that deserves comment is the decision by Alexander to direct XXX Corps along Route 124， cutting across the U。S。 45th Infantry Division and effectively slowing down II Corps advance。 Holland notes that， "Historians over the years have repeatedly levelled the harshest criticism at Alexander's orders， arguing that they were a slight against the Americans， and one that showed a total lack of grip on his part and excessive deference to his hubristic Eighth Army commander。 That view， however， takes too much account of later reputations and not enough of the situation as it stood at the time， and really does need knocking on the head。" Holland maintains that the decision by Alexander， to give no detailed orders beyond the initial invasion plans of getting ashore， securing a bridgehead and capturing key airfields and ports， was a deliberate one: "The overall aim had always been then to get to Messina as quickly as possible; but there was no point issuing detailed orders on how this was to be done before those initial objectives had been taken， because it was impossible to know what the landscape would be like and how the Axis forces would be reacting。 This wasn't woolly thinking， it was common sense。 By the evening of 12 July， the situation was starting to look clearer。 Eighth Army had always been given the lead role in the HUSKY plan， and understandably so， both for geographical reasons - their launch base in Egypt - and because of their undoubted greater experience。 It cannot be stressed enough that when the plans were agreed back in early May， neither Patton nor his army had the experience to justify their taking the lead role。 There was absolutely no shame in this whatsoever。 It was just the way things were。" Seen in this light， Alexanders orders at this point were entirely reasonable， and even expected。 Alexander is someone that I have grown in admiration of the more I have learned about him， and this book does not interrupt that trend。 He must have had a patience of Job to handle both Patton and Montgomery and did it all with a self-effacing attitude and brisk efficiency。 Giving Patton free rein to sweep through the West of the island was only one example of Alexander's wisdom in action。 This operation gave Patton's men opportunity "to test much of what they'd trained to do and the logistical systems they had put in place。 By its conclusion， his soldiers had had valuable combat experience， had learned a great deal and now ready to be tested against stiffer opposition。 It had also been a terrific public relations exercise。" Remarkably， all this was achieved in a mere four days。 Equally， as the campaign went on the Allies demonstrated in spades their much greater operational and organisational skill。 Compared with the Italians， they also had much superior weaponry， machinery and discipline。 Again， Holland comments that， "Too often， historians have judged armies largely on tactical flair at the coal-face of war， when every bit as important is an army's ability to maintain its effort。 The better supplied and equipped and maintained an army is， the better are its chances of performing on the battlefield。 On Sicily in 1943， maintenance of the effort was absolutely crucial; and to keep two entire corps in ammunition， fuel， food， water and other essential supplies as they moved across difficult terrain， over such a wide area and at such speed， was immensely impressive。"Meanwhile， the opposition in the east stiffened substantially as the Germans took over and the front began to narrow towards Messina。 As well as the Germans， there was also a problem posed by "trying to fight a large-scale modern， mechanized and technologically advanced war in the narrow confines of an island of many hills and mountains and not many roads or much other modern infrastructure。。。there was a limit， and quite a severe one， to how much infantry， armour and artillery could pass down any one road。" In addition， because of the challenges with unloading supplies over the beaches the infantry had largely marched inland on their own feet rather than using the preponderance of transport vehicles they were used to。 As citizen soldiers they simply "could not be expected to attach day after day， night after night， without respite; nor could they be expected to take the kind of casualties a German or Soviet infantry battalion might be willing to expend。 Allied commanders were better men， too， for understanding that; as it was， Primosole Bridge and the fighting so far in the plain had proved as brutal and bloody and difficult as anything Eighth Army had yet faced in the war。 A very delicate balance had to be struck in pushing forward as aggressively as possible - but not at too great a price。" The German defenders， on the other hand， were expected to endure to annihilation if needed， and this discipline was ruthlessly enforced in a way that would have been politically impossible for the Allies， even had it been militarily desirable。 Finally， environmental conditions also hindered Allied progress， as the proportion of casualties due to malaria grew to over 50 per cent。In the end， of course， the Allies did secure victory on Sicily， and the remaining German and Italian troops were withdrawn across the Straits of Messina to Italy。 Even with the more attritional fighting in the north west of the island， the whole conquest of Sicily only took 38 days。 In closing， Holland reflects on his own time in Sicily and rightly concludes that， "Etna seems to bear down， somehow mystical with its puff of volcanic cloud on top， and it's impossible not to be awed by the scale of the island， the awfulness of having to fight here， or amazed by the endless series of mountaintop towns that had to be climbed up to and down from and fought over。 It's still not a fast or easy place to get around， and travelling across the island it is all too easy to understand why manoeuvring highly mechanised and industrialised armies through this terrain was so difficult。 The Allies have often been accused of being too slow， too stodgy， too risk averse。 These criticisms， are， for the most part， misplaced。 Britain and America - rightly - decided to use mechanisation as much as possible， but rarely were they able to use their might in mechanised materiel to its very best advantage。 Not on Sicily， anyway: perhaps following the end of the Normandy campaign in late August 1944， or after crossing the River Po in northern Italy in April 1945， but certainly not here， where they found themselves canalised by geography and by too many small roads unsuited to the scale of operations they were mounting。 It's no wonder it took time to advance on occasion。 It is impossible not to conclude that conquering this extraordinary island in a mere thirty-eight days was a very impressive performance indeed。 Having studied this campaign - and the wider war - in great detail， I simply do not understand why historians have been so grudging about what was achieved here。" 。。。more
Chris simpson
，
I enjoyed this account of the assault in Sicily。 Not knowing much about this it was refreshing to read a well written recounting of this conflict。Having enjoyed James Holland's fictional work I can say that his non-fiction es equally good I enjoyed this account of the assault in Sicily。 Not knowing much about this it was refreshing to read a well written recounting of this conflict。Having enjoyed James Holland's fictional work I can say that his non-fiction es equally good 。。。more
Chris Damon
，
Wonderful book about an important WW2 campaign that’s been overshadowed by the Normandy invasion of the following year， and generally neglected and under-appreciated by most WW2 histories。
Joe McMahon
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Sicily '43: The First Assault on Fortress EuropeThis captivating narrative of thirty-eight days in the conquest of Sicily grabbed my interest all the way through。 Arriving， the Brits and Americans found the task easier than expected， but also horribly fatal for parachutists who landed in water or in dangerous clumps。 Eleven months before Normandy， the generals learned what they should not do with gliders。---Departing， the Germans and Italians had geographic advantage at Messina， something I had Sicily '43: The First Assault on Fortress EuropeThis captivating narrative of thirty-eight days in the conquest of Sicily grabbed my interest all the way through。 Arriving， the Brits and Americans found the task easier than expected， but also horribly fatal for parachutists who landed in water or in dangerous clumps。 Eleven months before Normandy， the generals learned what they should not do with gliders。---Departing， the Germans and Italians had geographic advantage at Messina， something I had not known about。 Narrow roads， a trapezoidal peninsula helped those fleeing。 The hills restricted close bombing of the ferries。 Contrary to other writers， the author claims that the German troops that fled did not add much to the fighters on mainland Italy。 However， their equipment was valued。---The book is replete with accounts of individuals， infantrymen and higher ranks。 ---Sicilians suffered。---Page 304。 On 12 July 1943， the Germans called off their attack at Kursk， freeing troops for Sicily。 They effectively took over the Sicilian resistance to the Allied invasion， but quickly moved to fall-back lines of defense。Page 386。 An allied soldier lost his life because the Germans saw the glint of the lens of his binoculars。Page 394。 A clear explanation of the easy use of a Bailey bridge。 。。。more
Paul Drinkwater
，
Superbly written， paced and mixing up the air， sea and land operations with excellent interweaving stories， this is a book for someone who is just getting started， to the more experienced reader on WWII。 James Holland has done a wonderful job of bringing the invasion of Sicily together。 The sections of Monty， Patton and other leaders， intertwined with stories of heroism at the rank and file level， is particularly rewarding to the reader。An excellent book。
HistoryBuff
，
4。5Very good narrative of the campaign in Sicily。 Has a tendency to jump around somewhat， going from an American， to a Italian， then German experience of the battle or conditions。 Can be a little difficult to keep track。 However， the maps are a big help along with the listing of the principal personalities。 You definitely get a sense of what it was like during the summer in Sicily and the hard terrain the troops had overcome。
Jack
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Solid history， well written。
Nick denton
，
Holland provides fresh new perspectives on the allies achievements rather than the cliche Patton dash and Montgomery caution。 The chaos of the allied landing is well covered as is the Axis reactions。 He also avoids the obvious Italian poor fighting capability by highlighting their poor equipment and training but covering the bravery shown by some of their units。 Glad I read this even though I know the story well。
Bob H
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This is a well-researched work that focuses on the Sicily campaign directly， rather than as a chapter in a larger work on the war in the Mediterranean。 The book doesn't overwhelm the reader with details or minutiae， but tells the story in a straightforward way。 This was the first major Allied landing on European soil， and the first one on a contested beachhead。 Its fall would open up the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and would threaten mainland Italy。 The landings， the internal friction on bo This is a well-researched work that focuses on the Sicily campaign directly， rather than as a chapter in a larger work on the war in the Mediterranean。 The book doesn't overwhelm the reader with details or minutiae， but tells the story in a straightforward way。 This was the first major Allied landing on European soil， and the first one on a contested beachhead。 Its fall would open up the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and would threaten mainland Italy。 The landings， the internal friction on both sides （US/British and German/Italian） and command problems， the painful progress through steep and primitive landscape， all this is told well， and includes a number of first-person accounts。 Highly recommend。 。。。more
Igor Hendrickx
，
As usual， James Holland clearly describes a battle from the strategic and tactical pov。 He helps put things in perspective。 Especially his description of the rivalry between Patton and Montgomery opened up some interesting avenues。
Mark
，
In ‘Sicily 1943， an account of ‘Operation Husky’， James Holland provides the reader with a visceral narrative of life in the front line for the ordinary serviceman caught up in a brutal military campaign。 Given the Allies were a combined force of volunteers and conscripts with relatively few career servicemen at their disposal， and this ‘amateur’ and largely untrained army up found itself up against German forces who were determined， disciplined and well trained， combat was a challenging and lif In ‘Sicily 1943， an account of ‘Operation Husky’， James Holland provides the reader with a visceral narrative of life in the front line for the ordinary serviceman caught up in a brutal military campaign。 Given the Allies were a combined force of volunteers and conscripts with relatively few career servicemen at their disposal， and this ‘amateur’ and largely untrained army up found itself up against German forces who were determined， disciplined and well trained， combat was a challenging and life shattering experience。 Surrender was not an option for the Axis forces who knew they had to fight to the death; any reluctance to fight was met with the firing squad。 In addition to perceptive analysis of military strategy， and the ad hoc nature of the planning for ‘Operation Husky’ done on the hoof by the Allied Commanders strung out along the Mediterranean and separated by hundreds of miles - in Cairo， Algiers， Malta， Gibraltar， and Tunisia - the author provides a comprehensive narrative of the fighting， and provides a full understanding of the context of the Sicilian Campaign， and how it influenced the outcome of the Second World War。 Not a 'side-show' as some historians have suggested， compared say with the Eastern Front， where the numbers of 'boots on the ground' far exceeded Sicily but a vial strategic gain and invaluable experience for the Allies when it came to D Day in Normandy， eleven months later。 Overtures were made to Mafia bosses and anti-fascist groups to encourage the Italian forces， some 200，000 strong， to surrender but these troops were soon bolstered by 70，000 German troops made up of both air and ground forces， of a different calibre altogether。 The Allies 'fought with steel'， far greater ordnance， given their overwhelming superiority in supply and they faced an enemy fighting with 'muscle'， putting their lives on the line。 The Allies had 160，000 men land on 10th July 1943， backed by 14，000 vehicles， 3，500 aircraft and 2，590 naval vessels， and thirty eight days later the island had been liberated。 Included in planning was ‘Operation Barclay'， a disinformation campaign， in which the deception known as 'Mincemeat’ or 'The Man with No Name’ was to persuade Hitler that his conviction was right and his High Command was wrong; that the Allies would cross from North Africa to Greece and the Balkans， and thus endanger Nazi Germany’s vital oil supplies from Rumania。 For this reason the Axis， fortunately for the Allies， had not added to the defences of Sicily。Operation Husky was the first Allied landing since their ignominious withdrawal from Dieppe in August 1942， but it was a challenging task given the scorching heat and pervasive disease， dysentery and malaria。 Holland writes， ‘ It really cannot be stressed enough just how brutal it was trying to fight in Sicily。 The terrible heat of the day sapped everyone’s energy。 Dust got everywhere。 Flies and mosquitoes buzzed and whined incessantly。 Most men spent much of the day with large dark sweat patches on their shirts and glistening brows， swatting and slapping insects whenever they could。 No one got much sleep， especially not when on the move or in combat。 Tin helmets became painfully hot， but to be without one was courting disaster because in this rocky terrain razor-sharp and potentially lethal shards of stone would fill the air space whenever artillery and mortar shelling began。’ His writing is wonderfully descriptive and often surprising as with paradoxes， “The air was thick with the stench of rotting bodies， explosives， smoke， and lemons， the citrus scent heavy from the shredding the groves had received。”Biographical details are included for people like General Patton， “Kill every one of the goddamn bastards，” he told his forces， and Paddy Mayne who was instrumental in the formation of the SRS （Special Raiding Squadron） and forerunner of the SAS。 ‘Mayne was something of a legend being a former rugby International for both Ireland and the British Lions and known for his fearlessness stamina and imperturbability in the face of extreme danger。’ Mayne was an imposing character standing well over six feet tall with a reddish beard ‘his form seemed to fill the whole tent with wrists twice the size of those of a normal man，’ etc ， illustrated with the story of a drunken spree in a bar in Cairo for good measure。 The author catalogues the lives of every day civilians finding themselves being asked to kill， “Ordinary， peaceful， law-abiding young men were trained to kill other young men — and so they did。 Violence and brutality and even indifference to these horrors had become a new kind of normal。'There was inevitably a huge death toll， with survival being serendipitous on the front line。 One victim was Yorkshire & England slow left arm spin bowler， Hedley Verity， and as a cricket lover I was particularly moved by the author’s poignant account of his death。 Verity had played in the ‘Bodyline Tour’ of 1933-34 and had taken fourteen wickets in the Ashes victory at Adelaide。 Now Captain Verity， 38 years old and suffering from the debilitating effects of dysentery， remained at the front with his men as they stormed a a distant farmhouse。 Verity was hit in the chest by a piece of shrapnel and dumped to the ground in agony。 Yet he still implored his men to press on。 There had been plans to withdraw him from the front line， after the Sicily campaign， but the chance never arose。During the battle， Verity was struck in the chest and his batman， private Tom Rennoldson， found Verity and was able to carry him to a field hospital， where an emergency operation was carried out。 Then， in sweltering， overcrowded conditions， he was ferried in an open railway truck across the straits of Messina to Reggio in Italy。 Verity， by now exhausted and in very bad health， reached Naples and was taken to a military hospital in Caserta。 There he was recognised by another injured Yorkshireman， medical orderly Corporal Henty from Leeds。 He showed photographs of his wife and two sons， before he underwent an operation to remove part of a rib that was pressing on his lung， under a local anaesthetic， but he suffered a series of haemorrhages。 which couldn't be stemmed， and died on the afternoon of 31st July。 James Holland's writing carries weight and authority as it is so rigorously researched but he always finds the 'human story' that prevents the reader becoming bogged down with too much military jargon and gory bloodletting （ there has to be some obviously）。 So， it is with the poignant information that the Italians gave Hedley Verity full military honours at his funeral， with officers at Caserta acting as pall bearers and his coffin itself being draped in a union flag。 。。。more
Matt Stevens
，
A long book。 Enjoyable， but at times a slog。 It is interesting that there isn't a series like Band of Brothers for this as there are so many incredible characters and stories。 A long book。 Enjoyable， but at times a slog。 It is interesting that there isn't a series like Band of Brothers for this as there are so many incredible characters and stories。 。。。more
John
，
This was a refreshing read。 I do agree， however， with one reviewer that James Holland does get bogged down in facts。 I found some details of the book to be unnecessary and some of it could have been cut to have a better flow。 Other than that， this is an excellent book for a campaign that we hear little about。 It seems we give the fighting in France and onward more attention。 I'm sure I could have a library dedicated to the Normandy Invasion。After securing North Africa， the Allies had to plan whe This was a refreshing read。 I do agree， however， with one reviewer that James Holland does get bogged down in facts。 I found some details of the book to be unnecessary and some of it could have been cut to have a better flow。 Other than that， this is an excellent book for a campaign that we hear little about。 It seems we give the fighting in France and onward more attention。 I'm sure I could have a library dedicated to the Normandy Invasion。After securing North Africa， the Allies had to plan where to strike next against the Axis Powers。 It was interesting to read that some of the German high command believed if the Allies take Sicily， the war would become a question of time before they were defeated。 It seemed like Hitler knew this， but his attitude was simply do or die。 I found the deception the Allies used against the Germans fascinating。 Providing a dead corpse with false information and sending commandos to Greece to make it look like they were planning to invade there。 Hitler bought it， but some of the German high command did not。 I learned more about Operation HUSKY and so much about this campaign。 The only problem was that some of the fat needed to be trimmed to have a better flow because， at times， I skipped a paragraph or two because of unnecessary detail。 。。。more
James Smith
，
There are large parts of this books which were excellent - totally engaging and very informative - the the writing style is easily accessible。 It’s really interesting to see how the whole tide of WWII was changed through this invasion。 I can also see why so many others have given this 4 or 5 stars。 However， for me， it would have been better if it was 100 pages sorter with less description of the battles in minute detail as for me， as someone new to military books of this sort， it was a bit repet There are large parts of this books which were excellent - totally engaging and very informative - the the writing style is easily accessible。 It’s really interesting to see how the whole tide of WWII was changed through this invasion。 I can also see why so many others have given this 4 or 5 stars。 However， for me， it would have been better if it was 100 pages sorter with less description of the battles in minute detail as for me， as someone new to military books of this sort， it was a bit repetitive at times。 。。。more
Jonny
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"The Allies have often been accused of being too slow， too stodgy， too risk-averse。 These criticisms， are， for the most part， misplaced。 Britain and America – rightly – decided to use mechanization as much as possible， but rarely were they able to use their might in mechanized materiel to its very best advantage。 Not on Sicily， anyway: perhaps following the end of the Normandy campaign in late August 1944， or after crossing the River Po in northern Italy in April 1945， but certainly not here， wh "The Allies have often been accused of being too slow， too stodgy， too risk-averse。 These criticisms， are， for the most part， misplaced。 Britain and America – rightly – decided to use mechanization as much as possible， but rarely were they able to use their might in mechanized materiel to its very best advantage。 Not on Sicily， anyway: perhaps following the end of the Normandy campaign in late August 1944， or after crossing the River Po in northern Italy in April 1945， but certainly not here， where they found themselves canalized by geography and by too many small roads unsuited to the scale of operations they were mounting。 It’s no wonder it took time to advance on occasion。 It is impossible not to conclude that conquering this extraordinary island in a mere thirty-eight days was a very impressive performance indeed。 Having studied this campaign – and the wider war – in great detail， I simply do not understand why historians have been so grudging about what was achieved here。"James Holland bridges the gap between the second and third volumes of his Mediterranean trilogy with an examination of the Allies first major amphibious operation and break in to Fortress Europe。 Taking a starting point at the planning stage， while the Tunisian campaign was still in progress， the narrative follows the action through the initial landings， through the airborne action at Primasole Bridge， the grinding advance across some particularly inhospitable terrain to the ultimate Axis withdrawal from the island。Drawing down from the command level - from which criticism of the senior British and American leadership is fairly levelled were appropriate， together with their achievements - down through the company， squadron， to platoon level， the campaign unfolds through a number of personal accounts， relating the tragic， heroic and mildly absurd; you'll meet film stars， generals， mafiosi， a host of people who'll appear in the invasion of France less than a year later and the tallest man to fold himself into a cockpit: "Dundas set off with 43 Squadron at 5。25 a。m。， accompanying his housemate at Hal Far， Squadron Leader Micky Rook。 Dundas was particularly tall at 6 feet 4 inches， but Rook was reputedly the tallest man in the RAF at 6 feet 6½ – and because he also had very large feet， he always wandered about in bedroom slippers， leaving his flying boots permanently wedged into the rudders of his Spitfire; as he clambered on to the wing， he would toss his slippers to his ground crew and somehow fold himself into the cockpit。" The text follows Holland's recurrent theme that history has been unkind to the Allies， that the Axis forces abilities were somewhat overblown， and makes the point in some detail that while there were disagreements within the Allied camp， it was as nothing when compared to the Axis， who could barely communicate。 Montgomery and Patton may have been pains in the arse at times， but it's unlikely that any scenes like this would occur between them:"They were now at Trecastagni in the last line of settlements before the slopes of Etna became too steep for habitation。 So， too， that morning of 6 August， were Jupp Klein and his fellow Fallschirmjäger engineers， who had been busy laying mines and explosive charges at significant points， including two houses opposite one another at a narrow place in the middle of the town on the main road that led north towards Messina。 This had involved ordering the civilians to leave their homes and get clear。 Unsurprisingly， the inhabitants were far from happy， and a crowd soon gathered。 Some were crying; others began threatening the Fallschirmjäger with old rifles and shotguns。 ‘The spectre only came to an end when our platoon sergeant had a group of machine-gunners with an MG42 set up on the market square，’ noted Klein， ‘and made it clear to the insurgents that if they continued to obstruct their tasks he would have them shoot without consideration。’"And at the last， Holland provides a perfect example of why the Allies would ultimately win:"After Brolo， the Americans had ground their way through yet more detonations and mines until they’d reached the tunnel that ran under Capo Calavà。 The retreating Germans had not blocked the tunnel， but they had blown a large 120-yard section of the road the far side， most of which now lay at the foot of the cliffs below。 It was possible for individual troops to pick their way across the scree， but the way was utterly impassable for vehicles。 The 10th Engineer Battalion was hurried forward， and Pyle watched in awestruck amazement as they set to work at around four o’clock that afternoon。 Bulldozers， winches， jackhammers – all seemed to appear by magic， while men scurried about， stripped to the waist and glistening with sweat， each of them looking completely on top of what he was supposed to be doing。 Overnight they drilled and blasted two holes into the side of the cliffs， while pneumatic drills helped create ledges at either end on to which abutments of wood were bolted。 By morning， uprights were being lowered into the drilled holes as struts on to which cross-beams were then attached。 Pyle watched one man， ‘doing practically a wire-walking act’， edge out over the timber and， with a pneumatic bit， bore a long hole down through two timbers。 Into this was hammered a steel rod， joining them up。 Others added more bracing， sledge-hammering huge spikes into the timbers。 The whole thing was bound together with steel cables， tightened by a mechanical winch。 By 11 a。m。 on the 13th， just nineteen hours after work had begun， General Truscott himself rolled over in a jeep。 More strengthening work continued， and by afternoon heavy vehicles were crossing and the division was rumbling forward once more。 Pyle was bowled over by what these engineers had achieved。 ‘They had built a jerry bridge， a comical bridge， a proud bridge，’ he wrote， ‘but above all the kind of bridge that wins wars。’ He was not wrong。 "It's a fascinating look at the Sicilian campaign， from the level down to the foxhole， a further link in the chain where the Western Allies learn more lessons in how to operate together and how to win。 Recommended for anyone interested in the period， who wants an account free of any false modesty or whitewashing。 。。。more
Lisa Kiely
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Very good although the first half was taken up by the planning of the operation which was abit long and tidious， the second half which was about the people involved and the fighting was much better
Jonathan
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In places this was a tough read， but just like the land it was fought on - the slog was worth it in the end。 This is the second book by James that I have read this year and like Burma 44 it was beautifully researched and written。 A real tribute to those that fought on Sicily both Axis and Allies - courageous men。 Spitfire and Kittywakes （P40） fighting in the skies above！
Crt
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Highly readable， packs in a lot of detail but not in a dry stodgy way
Nick
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I generally like Holland’s works quite well so I was well-disposed to like this one before I started。 Unlike several of the other reviewers， the seemingly copious detail did not bother me in the least。 It not only adds necessary background and detail but supports the points Holland is trying to make。 The issue I have with this book is that it almost totally whitewashes all the issues – save the airborne landings – that plagued this campaign from its inception。Holland is totally enthralled with A I generally like Holland’s works quite well so I was well-disposed to like this one before I started。 Unlike several of the other reviewers， the seemingly copious detail did not bother me in the least。 It not only adds necessary background and detail but supports the points Holland is trying to make。 The issue I have with this book is that it almost totally whitewashes all the issues – save the airborne landings – that plagued this campaign from its inception。Holland is totally enthralled with Alexander as a man， a soldier， and a commander。 The first two， he’ll get no argument; as to the last， he’s in a distinct minority。 Alexander was notorious in his disparaging opinion of the American fighting man， based （deservedly） on their initial combats in Africa。 By this point， the GI had learned quickly and well and was almost the equal of his more-experienced Commonwealth counterpart。 （Alex never acknowledged this， even after Sicily。） He also failed to exert any command authority over either of his two main subordinates: Montgomery and Patton， preferring to kick everything “downstairs” to the former; Holland virtually ignores Montgomery riding roughshod over both the planning and initial command situation， going no further than his being a bit difficult。 This is akin to stating that losing a limb is only mildly disconcerting and ignores the rivalry between the two armies in first reaching Messina。 （He basically says that Monty was glad the US got there first） He further glosses over the rather inefficient Allied air campaign， which spent most of its resources engaging strategic targets like railroads and roads on the Mainland， which had little actual effect on stopping German supplies and reinforcements coming and going from Sicily， rather than applying that airpower against the German forces on the ground。In short， Holland looks at Sicily as a large success。 It was， if you only consider than the Allies did take island。 Given their superiority in manpower， equipment， and resources， it would have been shocking if they didn’t。 While nobody expected that taking Sicily would be easy， there were a number of Allied mis-steps， many of them preventable， that the Allies made before and would repeat later on。 If not ignored， these are barely referenced。 Holland’s point of view is “Well， it all came right in the end， what？” On the tactical level， this book is well worth the read。 As a critical analysis of the Sicilian campaign， not so much。 。。。more
Cynthia
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This is a great book/account of the Sicilian Campaign of WWII！ It won't be for everyone。。。。it's quite a comprehensive account， & uses a lot of those country's involved spelling & ID of their military's groups。 There are a lot of names/players， from several countries involved。。。。。so there is a lot to keep track of。 It actually was kind of slow reading thru the 1st 1/3 of the book， while I adjusted to all the nomenclature & geography。。。。。。but then it took off！ At that point， I'd become more famili This is a great book/account of the Sicilian Campaign of WWII！ It won't be for everyone。。。。it's quite a comprehensive account， & uses a lot of those country's involved spelling & ID of their military's groups。 There are a lot of names/players， from several countries involved。。。。。so there is a lot to keep track of。 It actually was kind of slow reading thru the 1st 1/3 of the book， while I adjusted to all the nomenclature & geography。。。。。。but then it took off！ At that point， I'd become more familiar to this story & it was actually quite interesting & easy to march thru it with the campaign。。。。。 so much so that I stayed up into the night reading！ It was/is especially interesting to me， as my father was a part of The Big Red One。。。。。joining them in N。Africa & all along thru Germany。 It's a very thorough book， the Postscript at the end tells where many of the players thru out the book ended up after the war & there is a Timeline at the end that gives the date/time that events took place。 This will be for those interested in history， military history。。。。。。really is a great account of a part of the war that is often overlooked。 I really learned a lot & am glad for having read it！I received this e-ARC from publisher Grove Atlantic via NetGalley， after offering to read it & post my own fair/honest review。 。。。more
Matt Whittingham
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Overall this was a good listen。 I enjoyed it a little less than James Holland’s other WW2 accounts， mainly as it is pretty exhaustive， with over 20 hours on audio book。 For scholars and enthusiasts who really want this level of detail on what is largely a footnote （albeit an important one） in the overall story of the Second World War， this would be a highly rated read。 For me， it’s a bit too in depth， taking around 8 hours on the wider context， before the Allies even set foot on the Island。 From Overall this was a good listen。 I enjoyed it a little less than James Holland’s other WW2 accounts， mainly as it is pretty exhaustive， with over 20 hours on audio book。 For scholars and enthusiasts who really want this level of detail on what is largely a footnote （albeit an important one） in the overall story of the Second World War， this would be a highly rated read。 For me， it’s a bit too in depth， taking around 8 hours on the wider context， before the Allies even set foot on the Island。 From then on， it’s a largely tactical story， as village by village， ridge by ridge， the Allies make steady progress to the Northern tip of the Island， and setting up the much larger invasion of the Italian mainland that was to follow。All the things I enjoy about James Holland’s books are here though。 Meticulous research， and a blend of both the big story， and the memorable characters and players from all sides。 The tensions and co-operation between the US and Commonwealth forces adding an extra dimension of interest to what is overall a great addition to the story of WW2。 。。。more
M Moses
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Extremely little has been written about the battle of Sicily when the Allies first attacked the Axis powers in Fortress Europe。 For those who who are really interested in World War II history， this is an excellent addition to fill that gap！
Mike Slawdog
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Disclaimer: I received this book as part of a Goodreads Giveaway in exchange for an honest review。Holland wrote an outstanding book detailing a large and critical but less-covered operation in WWII。 He draws from a lot of individual narratives to detail the story， which is mostly good but has some drawbacks。 Namely， there’s almost too many people to keep track of （he does list the key players in the front and has pictures of many of them）。 Personally the only individuals I was able to keep track Disclaimer: I received this book as part of a Goodreads Giveaway in exchange for an honest review。Holland wrote an outstanding book detailing a large and critical but less-covered operation in WWII。 He draws from a lot of individual narratives to detail the story， which is mostly good but has some drawbacks。 Namely， there’s almost too many people to keep track of （he does list the key players in the front and has pictures of many of them）。 Personally the only individuals I was able to keep track of at large were the pilots， in part because there were fewer of them and because I related to them more。 I should also add that he provides perspectives from American， Canadian， British， German， and Italian troops of widely varying ranks and civilians。 Based on his bibliography at the end， the book is exceptionally researched。The book comes with roughly a dozen maps at the front， and while a few locations were still tough to ascertain overall it was well above average in providing maps， which I found incredibly useful。 Holland does interject some opinion， which you can take or leave， most specifically on Montgomery， Patton， and their relationship to each other， the nature of German and Italian cooperation （or lack thereof）， and what he claims is an unfair perception of the Allied campaign among historians。Overall I’d highly recommend Sicily ‘43 to anyone interested in getting a layer or two deeper into WWII history than what’s broadly known and understood。 。。。more
David Slater
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James Holland at his very best。 A wonderful account of this overlooked but crucial campaign
Peter Goodman
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“Sicily ’43: the first assault on Hitler’s homeland，” by James Holland （Atlantic Monthly， 2020）。 One might argue that Holland has become the premier popular historian of World War II。 This volume follows on his magnificent work in “Normandy ’44” and “Big Week。” In some ways， it is actually more important， because the Normandy invasion already has been so well picked over。 There have been accounts of Sicily， but none with the depth and understanding of both sides---and the civilian toll as well。 “Sicily ’43: the first assault on Hitler’s homeland，” by James Holland （Atlantic Monthly， 2020）。 One might argue that Holland has become the premier popular historian of World War II。 This volume follows on his magnificent work in “Normandy ’44” and “Big Week。” In some ways， it is actually more important， because the Normandy invasion already has been so well picked over。 There have been accounts of Sicily， but none with the depth and understanding of both sides---and the civilian toll as well。 “Operation Husky” was the Allies’ second huge invasion， coming after the lessons learned during “Torch” in North Africa。 Some American troops thus had already been blooded， though the British were far more knowledgeable about actual fighting。 The initial assaults went well: the troop convoys， coming from America as well as North Africa， arrived where they were supposed to be right on time。 The landings also were well done。 But Holland is scathing about the things that were wrong: the glider landings were a disaster， and the parachute drops were not far behind。 Sicily itself was a terrible place for offensive warfare: no real room to maneuver for tanks; mountainous， with towns （and defenses） perched on hilltops very difficult to reach， let alone assault; fearsomely hot; extremely poor。 The Sicilians were by and large already suffering from lack of most modern technology; they were illiterate， uneducated， ignorant of what was going on in the world。 The Italian troops were as bad as reputed。 A few fought well， but they were mostly badly led， badly equipped， and had no interest in fighting: they surrendered in masses。 The Germans， of course， were much better and tougher， though the two divisions already on the island were not well positioned and not the strongest troops。 The German high command did send in some of their finest troops， who fought heroically。 Holland describes the experience of Luftwaffe pilots， increasingly outnumbered， short of supplies and repairs and airstrips。 The Allies had complete control of the air in very short order。 Holland rebuts many well-known accounts: Patton’s army was always supposed to go west and north; his lack of access to that central highway made all sorts of sense。 Even more， it is not true that the Allies failed to attack the Germans as they withdrew from Sicily。 They tried very hard over many days， but the Germans had surrounded the embarkation sites with so much anti-aircraft weapons it was almost certain death to make low-level attacks， and high-altitude bombing was a waste of time。 I could go on， but you get the idea。 Also， the maps as usual are superb （although for some reason the actual town of Troina is not shown）。 https://www。penguin。co。uk/authors/431。。。 。。。more
Steve
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